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NOTES
Agency-Apparent Authority and Agency by Estoppel: lEmerging Theories of Oil Company Liability for Torts of Service Station Operators
The average American motorist has no way of knowing what business arrangement exists between the operator of the local service station
he patronizes and the "brand name" oil company whose products the
station sells. Yet, in the past the nature of this business relationship has
been determinative on the issue of the liability of the oil company for
the torts of its operators because courts have consistently refused to hold
the oil company liable unless a master-servant or principal-agent relationship invoking respondeat superior could be established., Recently,
however, in Gizzi v. Texaco, Inc.2 the court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit looked to the apparent relationship between the oil company and
dealer and upheld apparent authority and agency by estoppel' as
grounds for jury consideration of oil company liability.
In Gizzi plaintiffs Gizzi and Giaccio (a passenger) were injured in
an expressway collision when the brakes failed on a van bought by Gizzi
from a Texaco operator on the day of the accident. As an incident to
the sale of the van, the Texaco dealer had repaired the brakes. Both
plaintiffs sued Texaco' for personal injury under theories of apparent
agency and agency' by estoppels citing Texaco's national advertising
portraying its dealers as being skilled in automotive servicing, evidence
of acquiescence by Texaco in the sale of used cars by this and other
dealers, and evidence of a sign on the premises that indicated the pres'Annot., 83 A.L.R.2d 1282 (1962); see Annot., 116 A.L.R. 470 (1938).
1437 F.2d 308 (3d Cir.) (2-I decision), cert. denied, 92 S.Ct. 65 (1971).
3
For purposes of this note, no attempt is made to distinguish between theories of apparent
authority and agency by estoppel. Some writers contend that apparent authority is based on
estoppel and that the two theories are substantially coextensive. P. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE
LAW OF AGENCY §§ 85-90 (4th ed. 1952). Others argue that apparent authority is founded upon
the objective theory of contracts and that apparent authority and agency by estoppel are distinguishable on grounds such as the estoppel requirement of change of position (for example, executory contracts are said to be enforceable under apparent authority but not estoppel); the origins of
estoppel being in tort, apparent authority in contract; and enforceability by the principal.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8, comment d at 32-33 (1957) [hereinafter cited as
RESTATEMENT]; W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 8E (1964). However, all seem
to agree that in most cases the elements of both theories are present and any differences are
immaterial. RESTATEMENT § 8, comment d at 32-33.
4
The station operator was not a defendant in the action. 437 F.2d at 309.
5
The plaintiffs also alleged actual agency, but no actual authority for the sale of the van was
found by the trial court or the appellate court. Id.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

ence there of an "Expert foreign car mechanic.'' 6 Especially singled out
was Texaco's slogan "Trust your car to the man who wears the star." 7
The district court ruled that plaintiffs had not introduced sufficient
evidence to warrant submission of the issues of apparent authority (or
actual authority) to the jury and directed a verdict in favor of Texaco.
On appeal the Third Circuit, in viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to plaintiffs, found that reasonable men could differ as to
whether Texaco had clothed its dealer with apparent authority to repair
and sell vehicles and remanded the case to allow the jury to consider
this question of fact."
Prior to the Gizzi decision, in cases involving the asserted liability
of oil companies for acts of their service station operators, the courts
had relied exclusively upon the doctrine of respondeat superior Under
this doctrine the courts examine the degree of "control" 10 or "right to
control"" between the company, as master or principal, and the dealer,
as servant or agent. The focal points in the respondeat superior analysis
are the written contract and, with varying emphasis, the working relationship. Relevant factors include who owns title to the business, how
the dealer is compensated, who controls the retail price, and whether the
oil company has the power to terminate the sales agreement, to withdraw essential equipment, or to control the station employees (especially
in their day-to-day conduct).2 Findings vary widely 3 because of differences of opinion as to how much control is necessary to invoke respon'Id. at 310.
7Id.
'In remanding for jury consideration the issues of apparent authority and agency by estoppel,
the court made clear that it found no "overwhelming case of liability." Id.
'Annot., 83 A.L.R.2d 1282 (1962); see Annot., 116 A.L.R. 470 (1938).
"A distinction is typically drawn between control over details of the work and mere control
over the result to be achieved. See, e.g., Miller v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 268 F.2d 114, 118 (5th Cir.
1959).
""One of the main criterions, if not the chief one, as to whether the relationship of respondeat
superior exists, is the right to control, and it is not a question as to whether that control is actually
48 S.W.2d 51, 57
Mo. App. _
assumed but whether it exists." Greene v. Spinning, (1931).
"Comment, Master and Servant-The FillingStation Operatoras an Independent Contractor, 38 MICH. L. REV. 1063, 1070 (1940); Annot., 83 A.L.R.2d 1282, 1284-85 (1962).
13For the purpose of tort liability the courts seem to differ over the extent to which
they will be influenced by the factors surrounding the relationship de hors the written
contract between the [filling station operator and the oil company] . .

.

.The myriad

factual combinations possible with varying degress of economic control complicate the
problem of forecasting the result in any particular situation.
Comment, 38 MICH. L. REV., supra note 12, at 1072.

19721

APPARENT A UTHORITY

deat superior and because of the profusion of types of arrangements
between oil companies and dealers."
The courts were consistent prior to the Gizzi decision in not accepting apparent authority or agency by estoppel as grounds for oil company

liability. Before 1952, according to one authority,' 5 no oil company had
ever been held liable under an estoppel theory arising from its apparent
ownership of its service stations. 6 Nor has the pattern changed: no
plaintiff has been successful in recovering from the oil company purely
under theories of apparent authority or agency by estoppel since then.

The courts rejected these theories on various grounds such as the fact
that no evidence existed as to why plaintiff patronized the station and

hence there was no evidence of reliance; 7 that it was common knowl-

edge that trademark signs were displayed by independent contractors;

8

that signs were not a "holding out" by the oil company but only an
indication that its products were sold; 9 and that newspaper advertise-

ments referred only to the sale of specific products depicted and created
no apparent authority or agency by estoppel with respect to brake repairs."0 Cawthon v. Phillips Petroleum Co.21 is perhaps a representative
case and was based on facts not unlike those in Gizzi. In Cawthon
plaintiff sued under theories of apparent authority and agency by estop-

pel (in addition to the usual actual agency theory) for injuries resulting
from a faulty repair of his brakes. Plaintiff stressed the display of oil

company signs, signs indicating "Brake Service" and "Mechanic on
Duty," general advertising, and especially the slogan "Come to your

Phillips 66 Dealer for all the things you need to help your car perform
"For example, Texaco owns and operates stations, leases land owned by Texaco to "independent dealers," and leases land from third parties for operation of service stations by "independent
dealers." In other situations, the dealer leases land directly from the third party. Brief for Appellants at 16-17, Gizzi v. Texaco, Inc., 437 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1971). All of these basic arrangements
are subject to further variation in the individual contracts.
'P. MECHEM, supra note 3, § 442.
"6Actually in Standard Oil Co. v. Gentry, 241 Ala. 62, 1 So. 2d 29 (1941), an isolated case,
the court in affirming a judgment against the oil company held that it was for the jury to determine
whether or not the oil company was estopped from denying liability. However, special facts existed
in that case in that plaintiff had patronized the station previously when it was operated by the oil
company, and his testimony tended to show that his reason for transferring his business back to
this station was "an unsatisfactory experience with an independent operator and a desire to do
business with a more responsible party." Id. at 64, 1 So. 2d at 31.
"Miller v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 278 F.2d 114, 118 (5th Cir. 1959).
"Reynolds v. Skelly Oil Co., 227 Iowa 163, 171, 287 N.W. 823, 827 (1939).
"9Sherman v. Texas Co., 340 Mass. 606, 608, 165 N.E.2d 916, 917 (1960).
2
Cawthon v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 124 So. 2d 517, 521 (Fla. Ct. App. 1960).
21124 So. 2d 517 (Fla. Ct. App. 1960).
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at its best." The photograph that accompanied Phillips' advertisement
in which the slogan was used depicted only products sold outright by
Phillips to the dealers, and the court found any representation to be
limited to "things" for sale. The court found neither a solicitation of
mechanical or repair services nor an assertion of agency in Phillips'
advertising and affirmed a summary judgment in favor of the oil company.
While Gizzi breaks this pattern of rejection of apparent authority
and agency by estoppel, its handling of the traditional elements of the
two theories poses some problems. Gizzi is somewhat at odds with
apparent authority cases in other business settings in its handling of the
reliance factor (in this case plaintiffs' belief and reliance on Texaco's
"standing behind" the sale and repair of the vehicle by its dealer).
Traditionally, the plaintiff must have relied upon the principal's indicia
of authority 2 (in Gizzi upon Texaco's advertising, signs, and the "foreign mechanic" sign). Proof that his reliance is justifiable and reasonable is an essential element of the plaintiff's case 23 and he has the burden
of proof.24 The court did make a cursory reference to reliance by plaintiff Gizzi but there was no mention of reliance by plaintiff Giaccio
(the passenger) at all in the opinion.26 Allowing Giaccio to take his case
to the jury on remand, riding the coattails of Gizzi's reliance, would
seem to broaden the scope of potential oil company liability beyond that
encompassed by traditional concepts of apparent authority.2
"Bowman v. Home Life Ins. Co. of America, 260 F.2d 521, 523 (3d Cir. 1958).
§§27, 267. The court in Gizzi cites § 267 with respect to reliance:
One who represents that another is his servant or other agent and thereby causes a third
person justifiably to rely upon the care or skill of such apparent agent is subject to
liability to the third person for harm caused by the lack of care or skill of the one
appearing to be a servant or other agent as if he were such.
RESTATEMENT § 267.
""However, it is part of plaintiff's case to prove some element of reasonable reliance." W.
SEAVEY, supra note 3, § 90.
""Appellant Gizzi testified that he was aware of the advertising engaged in by Texaco and
that it had instilled in him a certain sense of confidence in the corporation and its products." 437
F.2d at 310.
16The only references to Giaccio in appellants' brief aside from general references of reliance
by "plaintiffs" are that Giaccio also patronized the service station in question, was present when
there were discussions in regard to the vehicle purchased, and was at the station when the vehicle
was actually picked up. Brief for Appellants at 27, 32.
2RESTATEIENT § 8, comment e at 35, illustration i1,
gives this example:
The Ace Taxi Company employs no drivers but merely receives orders from prospective passengers and puts "Ace Taxi Company" on cabs owned and operated by
independent drivers. One of those drivers collides negligently with another automobile,
damaging one of its passengers who reasonably believes the Taxi Company to be the
13RESTATEMENT

1972]

APPARENT A UTHORITY

Closely related to the reliance issue is a problem raised by Gizzi
with regard to scope of apparent authority. That is, based upon the
representations of the oil company to the public, what range of activities
by the dealer might a motorist reasonably surmise to be authorized by
the company? This aspect of Gizzi seemed most to bother the trial
judge" and the dissenting judge29 who felt that no reasonable man could

believe that Texaco would authorize and stand behind the repair and
sale of a used vehicle and, therefore, that the case should not go to the

jury. What constitutes a sufficient factual issue to take the case to the
jury is perhaps the critical question in all apparent authority cases

reaching for a "deep pocket." In a recent case, Wallach v. Williams,"0
the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed a decision that no factual issue

of apparent authority was posed for the jury when a motorist fueling
his car at a service station was struck by an automobile negligently
driven by a station attendant. The court, however, specifically reserved

for determination in an "appropriate" case the question whether the
negligence of an independent contractor or his employees 3' might be
employer. The Taxi Company is liable to the passenger but not to the owner of the other
automobile.
"The Third Circuit opinion quoted the district court judge:
"In short, nobody could reasonably interpret any of these slogans or representations or
indicia of control as dealing with anything more than the servicing of automobiles, and
to the extent of putting gas in them and the ordinary things that are done at service
stations.
"That 'Trust your car to the man who wears the star' could not possibly be construed to apply to installing new brake systems or selling used cars."
437 F.2d at 310 (district court opinion unreported).
"The majority relied in part on RESTATEMENT § 267. The dissenting judge stressed the last
part of comment a to § 267:
"This rule normally applies where the plaintiff has submitted himself to the care or
protection of an apparent servant in response to an apparent invitation from the defendant to enter into such relations with such servant. A manifestation of authority constitutes an invitation to deal with such servant and to enter into relations with him which
are consistent with the apparent authority."
437 F.2d at 311, quoting RESTATEMENT § 267, comment a at 578 (emphasis by the judge).
-52 N.J. 504, 246 A.2d 713 (1968).
"If apparent authority is relied on, it follows that oil companies would be liable for torts of
employees of the service station operator (and not just the operator), since it is the motorist's
reliance on the oil company's indicia of authority or invitation that establishes liability. Under the
respondeat superior approach, if a principal-agent or master-servant relationship is found between
the oil company and the service station operator, the oil company is likewise liable for subemployees:
Where the immediate question is the status of some subemployee or subagent of
the [service station operator], it is generally true that his status, in relation to the
producing company, follows that of the . . . service station operator, the same general
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imputed to an oil company when it appears to the ordinary motorist that
the oil company is operating the station or is sufficiently in control to
extend an invitation to the public to buy the products or services there."2
Policy grounds underlying apparent authority and estoppel as opposed to respondeat superior seem distinguishable in certain areas. One
writer cites what he calls the "lip service" paid by the courts to the
control test as the basis for respondeat superior as "an attempt to
correlate the doctrine with the general rule of tort liability, that of
fault. '33 Apparent authority and estoppel have no such connection
with fault: "Like apparent authority, [estoppel] is based on the idea that
one should be bound by what he manifests irrespective of fault .....,,'

The "enterpriser's risk"' 35 theory of respondeat superior contrasts with
both the apparent-authority idea of a party's being bound by the reasonable expectations he creates" and the similar (some say identical) estoppel notion that as beteween two innocent parties the burden is placed
on the one whose misleading manifestations have created reliance and
change of position. However, the "deep pocket" rationale, which is
often characterized as the true explanation behind the doctrine of respondeat superior, might be said to apply equally to apparent authority
and agency by estoppel, at least in the oil company setting. Thus apparent authority could be a second avenue to achieve a social policy of risk
distribution with respect to injury caused by service station operators.
The oil company is clearly in the best position to assess the business
risks of social harm involved in its operation and to distribute the risk
to the public through its prices. Indeed, the dealer ordinarily has no
capacity to allocate the risk to the public through what he charges.
Prices are usually governed by the oil company with the dealer receiving
a commission based on sales. The advantage of apparent authority as a
factors being determinative.
Annot., 83 A.L.R. 2d 1282, 1285 (1962).
3The court cited RESTATEMENT § 8, comment e at 35, illustration II. 52 N.J. at 506, 246
A.2d at 714. Illustration II is set out in note 27 supra.
"Comment, 38 MICH. L. REv., supra note 12, at 1064-65.
31
RESTATEMENT § 8, comment d at 33.

5"Society imposes vicarious liability on the employer because his selection and direction has
put the employee in a situation where the wrong occurs and because he is the enterpriser who has

assumed the risks of gain or loss from the employee's work activities." Conant, Liability of
Principalsfor Torts of Agents: A Comparative View, 47 NEaB. L. REV. 42 (1968).

"Apparent authority "is that authority which, through [sic] not actually delegated to the
agent, the principal intentionally or inadvertently causes third persons to believe the agent to
possess." Conant, The Objective Theory of Agency: Apparent Authority and the Estoppel of
Apparent Ownership, 47 NEB. L. REv. 678, 681 (1968).
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means of reaching the "deep pocket" is that problems occasioned by the
"control" test of untangling complex oil company-dealer relationships
are avoided.
On the other hand, as Texaco argued, allowing an issue of apparent
authority to go to the jury on the quantum of evidence presented in Gizzi
may require oil companies not only to revamp their national advertising
but also to refuse to allow their dealers to repair or sell autos unless
those activities are stringently controlled by the oil companies. "For if
Texaco and other companies must become the guarantors of the nonnegligent performance of such services, then they must exercise control
over the conduct of their dealers in performing them." 7 Such control
would seem to violate a federal policy of preserving the independence
of the retail service station dealer,38 and the oil companies might run
the risk of antitrust prosecution if the dealer had no voice in determining
what products or services he would offer.39 These arguments notwithstanding, the oil company should not enjoy the benefits of chain-store
marketing methods and national identification with its station operators
without assuming concomitant social responsibilities. Moreover, it is
debatable whether the dealer is truly independent today. In addition,
liability has long been imposed on grounds of apparent authority and
estoppel in other business contexts."
In summary, one might conclude that apparent authority and
agency by estoppel do represent appropriate theories of oil company
liability. Gizzi breaks with the traditional pattern in recognizing that the
jury should have the opportunity to consider apparent authority in addition to the "control" arguments of respondeat superior. The problem
is that Gizzi may represent an outer limit with respect to what reasonable men could agree on as being within the apparent authority created
by the oil company's manifestations to the public. It cannot reasonably
be assumed that the oil company "holds out" its dealer with respect to
'Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 6-7, Gizzi v. Texaco, Inc., 437 F.2d 308 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 92 S.Ct. 65 (1971).
"The importance of the small retailer in our economy is difficult to overstate. In
the gasoline industry, he is the competitive entity that bears the greatest proportionate
risk and earns the lowest return on investment. As a small businessman, an individual

entrepreneur, his welfare is of particular concern to this Commission. Interference with
his right to compete as he chooses and unlawful practices that blunt the effect of his
efforts and tend to cause his elimination are matters calling for public intervention.

FTC, REPORT ON ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
(1967).
39
Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 9.
'OP. MECHEM, supra note 3, §§424-25, 442.

IN THE MARKETING OF GASOLINE

40
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each and every activity the dealer undertakes, and the sale and repair
of a used vehicle would seem to be on the borderline. Likewise, sending

the passenger's (Giaccio's) case to the jury without any showing of
reliance on his part seems unjustified under traditional approaches to
apparent authority. Whatever the jury outcome on remand (assuming
Gizzi is not later overturned), the Third Circuit has now cracked the
door that had barred from the jury plaintiffs suing oil companies under
theories of apparent authority and agency by estoppel. In so doing, it
has removed the greatest obstacle to recovery from the oil companies

under those long dormant theories.
CHARLES

R.

BRITT

Bankruptcy-Filing Fee Subjected to Constitutional Test
In 1892 Congress faced "the question whether this Government,

having established courts to do justice to litigants, will admit the

wealthy and deny the poor entrance to them."' Congress responded by
enacting an in forma pauperis statute granting indigents access to federal courts without prepayment of fees or costs. 2 When Congress later
adopted the present Bankruptcy Act in 1898, 3 it made specific provision
for an in forma pauperis proceeding.4 This allowed an indigent debtor5
to file a voluntary petition in bankruptcy and receive a discharge from

his debts without payment of the filing fee. In 1946, however, Congress
1H.R. REP. No. 1079, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1892).
2
Act of July 20, 1892, ch. 209, 27 Stat. 252 (now 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1970)). For a general
discussion of this statute, see Duniway, The Poor Man in the FederalCourts, 18 STAN. L. REV.
1270 (1966).
'Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544.
'Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, §§ 40a, 51(2), 30 Stat. 556, 558; General Order 35(4), 172
U.S. 665 (1898). The General Orders in Bankruptcy, adopted by the Supreme Court in 1898
pursuant to § 30 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 554, are designed to explain,
amplify, and apply the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act and have the full force of law except as
they conflict with the Act. The General Orders may be found as amended to December 31, 1970,
in the appendix to 11 U.S.C. (1970).
sThe in forma pauperis provision in the Bankruptcy Act from the beginning seems to have
been generally interpreted as meaning that a pauper is one totally without assets and available
credit. See, e.g., In re Medearis, 291 F. 709 (W.D. Tex. 1923); In re Collier, 93 F. 191 (W.D. Tenn.
1899). However, somewhat different standards of indigency were applied in Sellers v. Bell, 94 F.
801 (5th Cir. 1899), and In re Plimpton, 103 F. 775 (D. Vt. 1900). See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
1 51.04, at 1876-77 (14th ed. 1971). For a general discussion on in forma pauperis petitions in
bankruptcy, see Shaeffer, Proceedingsin Bankruptcy in Forma Pauperis,69 COLUM. L. REV. 1203
(1969).

